Birds Korea - Poultry Flu

Birds Korea and Poultry Flu

Birds Korea's thinking on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 Poultry Flu has been expressed in a number of position statements and mails to relevant organisations since 2005.

On this page please find some of our own (archived and more recent) statements, statements on "bird flu" made in the media, and a list of links to some of our previous statements and mails and links to statements by other organisations.

From 2005:
Rather than just assuming that wild birds are behind the spread of H5N1, we urge our members to ask media, decision-makers and other conservation organisations:

In what way does a similar genetic make up in the virus in birds in Poyang and birds at Qinghai constitute evidence that wild birds moved the virus from Poyang to Qinghai? Is it not possible that they could simply have been infected by the same strain of virus at a similar stage of that virus's evolution? That the virus in Turkey is also similar seems more to suggest that the virus was carried mechanically across China, and through to Turkey - as we all understand that there is not a single wild bird species that migrates in the way the virus spread last summer, yet there is plenty of trade that moves across Asia.

Of direct relevance to this: in which conditions would a virus be most likely to evolve/not evolve? In relatively stable conditions when the virus can always find a host (e.g. poultry) or in the various different environments encountered by stressed migrant birds? Why so little evolution of the virus detected between Poyang, Qinghai and Turkey?

No bird species is believed to migrate from Pohang to Qinghai and onto Europe (and now Nigeria), but spread by domino effect in wild birds also seems a rather poor hypothesis. If the domino effect was in place, then why would the spread be so one-directional? Why would outbreaks not have spread back eastward as well? Why no outbreaks in wild birds after Qinghai and Mongolia here in Korea? Or in India? (As an aside, why is this negative data not considered of significance, and included in discussions?).

Why in Poyang was there apparently no outbreak of disease in wild birds, yet at Qinghai there was? It might be the seasonal stresses involved; and/or it might be that birds occupying territories are less likely to move out from such territories once established, thus increasing risk of exposure, and/or it could be that the infection was at a different stage between sites.
It is clear that as the virus was so similar genetically that it was not due to some major evolutionary change in the virus itself.
Some studies have suggested that recovering domesticated mallards shed less virus than when incapacitated by disease. What seems evident is that the responses at Poyang and Qinghai were different (no outbreak in wild birds compared to severe outbreak). This alone at least suggests that the same birds from Poyang, unable to infect birds there, would be unable to infect birds at Qinghai. It seems unlikely that this is simply a matter of resistance: so few birds have been shown to be resistant to HPAI H5N1, and migratory birds are turning over at key wetlands all the time.
Would a reasonable hypothesis rather be that the recovering waterbirds had been exposed to the highly virulent virus some time before (i.e. not at Poyang); that when they arrived there (whether over a short distance or not) they did not shed enough virus to infect other wild birds? At Qingahi, exposure by waterbirds to the same strain of virus from a new local source then created an immediate outbreak in wild birds. Over time, this petered out as birds avoided infected areas, and the virus lost its virulence (in line with our understanding of natural selection). Background research reveals manure-enriched fish-farms at the same lake at Qinghai, a nearby Buddhist temple, and significant concentrations of poultry in local areas: all likely sources of virus?

The genetic evidence suggests shared origin: it does nothing to reveal how wild birds can actually infect poultry. We can easily see how wild birds have become infected though contact with other wild birds (e.g. at Qinghai and in Mongolia); we can see how wild birds have become infected through contact with poultry or contaminated environment (non-migratory bird species in Japan and Korea, perhaps Tree Sparrows in China); but are wild birds somehow supposed to become infected, then fly into chicken coops etc, before flying off again? In some areas, it is clear that there are free range poultry, and some opportunities for infection of poultry by wild birds (and again, vice versa, as with free-range duck rearing at Poyang and elsewhere), but how can a Great Crested Grebe on a lake in Novosibirisk for example be supposed to infect a flock of turkeys kept in a village? And how can this kind of improbable method of infection have happened not once, but tens or even now hundreds of times?

Birds Korea takes a very conservative, well-traveled line on H5N1. We believe that the movement of poultry and caged birds or contaminants from China, especially by road and rail, has led to an explosive near-one-directional movement, from areas with widespread (endemic) H5N1 and asymptomatic poultry into areas with a demand for cheap poultry products and limited control and documentation. We all know (for we have been saying it for years) that wild birds know no borders...So this presence or absence of border controls and strictly-enforced regulations can affect only poultry and caged birds. It is a major reason why the virus has not impacted Western Europe yet, nor several countries in Far East Asia; nor Australasia; nor North America. For such countries have much stricter controls on poultry and caged bird imports. This is why H5N1 is likely to continue to impact developing economies more significantly, countries where resources are more limited and where regulations and controls on movements of animals are less strict (Indonesia, Viet Nam, China, Turkey etc).

In summary, for the sake of the birds and for the sake of people, H5N1 should not be sensationalized or reported irresponsibly.
The spread (and method of spread) of the virus needs to be reported accurately and with balance, and specialists from many fields need to cooperate more efficiently to exchange relevant information openly and freely.
Based only on the best available information, the public and decision-makers then need to develop appropriate responses.
For now, these need to include improved biosecurity (preventing poultry from infecting wild birds and their habitats); improved regulation of trade in poultry and caged birds (especially in the understanding that some species can carry HPAI H5N1 asymptomatically); and greater protection of wild bird populations, in line with national laws or international conventions.

Assessment of virus movement across continents: using northern pintails as a test
Dirk V. Derksen, Alaska Science Center, 4210 University Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508

A CMC Misson report is available as downloadable .pdf document:

Understanding the potential role of wild birds in the epidemiology of the current HPAI outbreaks in the Republic of Korea 13-21 December 2006

On December 7th 2006 Nial Moores, Director of Birds Korea, made a presentation to a symposium on Avian Influenza at the Migratory Birds Observation centre in Gunsan, organized by UNDP-GEF and local bird conservation and citizens groups.

For the text please go to H5N1 Report presented by Nial Moores, Birds Korea

Birds Korea statements: